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Alastair Bissett-Johnson* Personal Injuries in Canadian
Motor Vehicle Insurance Policies
and the Conflict of Laws: An
Introductory Foray**
I. Introduction
At one time the personal injuries aspects of a motor vehicle insurance
policy were relatively simple. The insurer agreed to meet the cost of
personal injuries caused to a third party by the fault of the insured. These
are normally referred to as Section A benefits. In time, however, the
coverage of the policy could be increased1 by the payment of additional
sums so as to permit:
i) the insured persons to recover against their own insurer for injuries
or loss caused by an uninsured or under-insured driver in
circumstances in which liability existed at common law;
ii) recovery by the owner or driver regardless of proof of fault for injury
or loss arising out of the use or operation of a car;
iii) persons other than the driver or owner of a car (who came within the
extended definition of insured person) to recover defined amounts
from the insurer in circumstances (i) and (ii).
The so-called Section B or "no-fault" benefits usually benefitted the
owner or driver of a car (first-party claims) and members of his family or
others riding in the insured's car but could cover other passengers. The
inclusion of some "no-fault" benefits has become mandatory2 in motor
insurance policies. This increase in coverage runs into actual or potential
conflict with common law or statutory defences such as those restricting
or preventing actions between spouses3 or gratuitous passengers and the
driver who volunteered to drive them.
4
*Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University
**This article is dedicated to the memory of the late Professor Arthur Foote, a friend and
colleague who first kindled my interest in this area. The mistakes are, of course, my own. I
acknowledge the assistance of Tim Chick and William Gilliland, students at law, Dalhousie
University, in the preparation of this paper and my colleagues Vaughan Black and Leon
Trakman who made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. See, eg., the summary of developments in Canada in Linden, Canadian Tort Law, (3rd ed.:
Butterworths, 1982) c. 17.
2. E.g., in Ontario for policies after Jan. 1, 1972 (Linden, id at 632). Prior to that date from
1969 awards the coverage was voluntary.
3. See, eg., Married Women's Property Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 176, s. 17(3), and Insurance
Act, R.S.N.S. c. 148, s. 93, though this defence was abolished in May 1986 (S.N.S. 1986, c.
35).
4. See, eg., the Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191, s. 221(2)(b).
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At the same time as the scope of motor vehicle insurance policies
increased, a need became apparent to deal with conflicts of laws
problems. Generally in Canada jurisdiction could be asserted over a
defendant by means of (i) personal service within the jurisdiction; (ii)
submission; or (iii) ex juris rules.5 The latter did not guarantee that a
default or other judgment against the foreign defendant would be binding
in the defendant's home jurisdiction. 6 These general rules obviously
created hardship for people injured by foreign residents who were insured
by foreign insurance companies. One early step was to permit direct
enforcement of a judgment against a driver who was insured by a
company present within the jurisdiction7, coupled with incentives such as
the loss of his driving licence in his home jurisdiction8, to make the driver
comply with judgments of jurisdictions in which the driver had caused
personal injuries by his negligence. As if the jurisdictional problems were
not enough, they were compounded by the choice of law rules in the
conflict of laws, especially the rule9 governing foreign torts.
The purpose of this article is to explore in an initial but not exhaustive
foray how changes in the coverage of insurance policies coupled with
factors such as the development of government insurance monopolies
have necessitated changes in the conflict rules, and to evaluate the success
of the changes and the courts' performance with regard to the changes.
5. E.g., Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rule 10.08 (one of the broadest) allows service without
leave from the Court in any case in which a non-resident defendant normally lives in another
province of Canada or in a state of the United States.
6. The common law rules of recognition are based on personal service on the defendant within
the jurisdiction or submission. Reciprocity (outside the area of matrimonial law) has not been
a basis of recognition. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Acts add only the case
where the defendant in the original proceedings was carrying on business or was resident in
that jurisdiction.
It is profound irony that the Supreme Court of Canada in Moran v. Pyle [1975] 1 S.C.R.
393, could permit Saskatchewan jurisdiction over the Ontario company on the basis of "a tort
committed in the [Saskatchewan] jurisdiction" but could not guarantee on the existing state of
the law that the Saskatchewan judgement would be binding in Ontario.
This result would not follow in Australia because of the Federal Service and Execution of
Process Act which guarantees enforcement of judgements of one state in other states provided
a sufficient nexus exists between the "hearing" state and the cause of action. In matrimonial
law reciprocity has long been the basis of recognition of divorces and nullity decrees (see:
Robinson-Scott v. Robinson-Scott [1957] 3 WL.R. 842 (P.D.A.)) and under the Indyka
principle a more generous jurisdiction is conceded by the forum to a foreign jurisdiction than
the forum itself claims (Indyka v. Indyka, [1969]1 A.C. 33 (H.L.)).
7. E.g., see Nova Scotia Insurance Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 148, s. 101.
8. E.g., the Nova Scotia Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191, s. 203.
9. In view of the lack of precision in application of the Rule in Phillips v. Eyre (1869) 4 Q.B.
225, affd (1870) 6 Q.B. 1, and its variants, the term "rule' may be an overstatement verging
on an oxymoron.
Personal Injuries in Canadian Motor Vehicle Insurance Policies
II. The Extension of Coverage in Motor Vehicle Policies - Two
Different Provincial Models and Voluntary Private Extensions
Although Saskatchewan was perhaps the pioneer amongst the common
law provinces in reforming policies by means of its government agency, 10
it will be convenient to examine the Ontario model, both because it is the
province with the biggest population and because its interaction with
Quebec, the other province chosen, raises interesting conflicts of laws
problems.
1. Ontario and Quebec
The main elements of the Ontario scheme" graft onto the basic fault
based system a limited amount of compensation, regardless of fault, to
defined insured persons who sustain bodily injury or death, directly and
independently of all other causes, by an accident arising out of the use or
operation of an automobile 2.
The more radical Quebec approach was introduced on March 1,
197813 when the Parti Quebecois government created a new agency,
10. Wright, Linden, and Klar (eds.), Canadian Tort Law - Cases, Notes and Materials, (8th
ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1985), c. 21 at 36.
11. Insurance Ac4 R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, ss. 323, 233. See also Schedule 3 of this Act.
12. The system is described in more detail in Wright, Linden and Klar, supra, note 10, c. 21
at 30. An "insured person" includes any occupant of the insured vehicle, any person who is
struck in Canada by the insured automobile, and the insured and members of his family injured
while occupants of another vehicle or while they are pedestrians.
The benefits are substantial. All reasonable expenses incurred within four years from the
date of the accident for necessary medical, surgical, dental, chiropractic, hospital, professional
nursing, ambulance service, and rehabilitation care to a limit of $25,000 per person is paid. The
insurer, however, is not liable for any portion of these expenses that are "payable or
recoverable under any medical, surgical, dental, or hospitalization plan or law". In addition,
funeral expenses up to the amount of $1,000 per person will be reimbursed. Death benefits are
payable in the amount of $10,000 for a head of the household, $10,000 for the spouse of the
head of the household and $2,000 for dependants. If the head of the household dies, leaving
two or more survivors, an additional $1,000 is payable for each survivor other than the first.
Weekly disability benefits are forthcoming during the time when a person "suffers
substantial inability to perform the essential duties of his occupation or employment". To
qualify, this inability must occur within 30 days of the accident and the person must have been
employed at the date of the accident. These payments will stop after 104 weeks, however,
unless it is established that such injury continuously prevents such person from engaging in any
occupation or employment for which he is reasonably suited by education, training or
experience. In such a case weekly benefits will run for the duration of the inability.
The amount of the weekly benefit is 80 per cent of the gross weekly earnings subject to a
maximum of $140 per week. For a housekeeper who is unable to perform any of his or her
duties, by reason of incapacity, the payments are $70 a week to a maximum of 12 weeks.
Tort rights are preserved for losses over the amount of these benefits. Payments made under
the no-fault plan, however, are deducted from any tort recovery (Insurance Act R.S.O. 1980,
c. 218, s. 239(2)).
13. After the Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Automobile Insurance (1974) - Gauvin
Committee.
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called Rigie de l'Assurance Automobile du Qudbec to supply
compensation to all Quebec victims of auto accidents regardless of fault
in place of the traditional fault based system.' 4
2. Voluntary Extensions of Policies
In addition to the compulsory extensions required by provincial laws a
number of people chose to extend their coverage in case they were
injured by an uninsured or under-insured motorist. There were no doubt
many reasons for this but foremost amongst them were:
i) the fact that some Canadian drivers were driving in states of the
United States of America which had no unsatisfied judgments fund
for motor accident cases, and
ii) a trilogy of Supreme Court of Canada decisions 5 alerted drivers to
the fact that the provincial minimum coverage in their policies might
14. Wright, Linden and Klar, supra, note 10, c. 21 at 40 conveniently describe the main
elements:
... the right to sue in tort (or delict) was completely abolished. In its place, a
compensation system was enacted which pays all reasonable expenses incurred by those
injured in car accidents including $1,466.32 for funeral expenses. In addition, an
income replacement indemnity is payable to those victims who are unable to work as
a result of an accident. The minimum amount is $117.31 per week. The maximum
indemnity is 90% of net income, which is calculated after certain deductions are made
from a maximum gross annual salary of $26,000. These payments may be made for up
to five years and then may continue until retirement with appropriate deductions for
other benefits received. No payments are made for the first seven days.
Death benefits are also payable. The dependend survivors are entitled to a pension
based on Disability Income Benefits of the deceased. There is a minimum pension of
$117.31 plus $14.67 per dependent up to $175.66 and if minor children are killed the
parents receive $5,865.32.
An interesting feature of this plan is the payment of a lump sum indemnity up to a
maximum of $29,326.52 if a victim sustains injury, disfigurement, dismemberment or
loss of enjoyment of life.
As for appeal rights, there is a right of reconsideration by the Rigie- Following that, a
dissatisfied claimant may appeal to the Commission desAffaires Sociales.
Compensation funds are also established for accidents involving hit-and-run drivers,
certain accidents off the highway and for unsatisfied judgement up to a maximum of
$50,000.
Quebec citizens are covered by the plan if they are involved in accidents while outside
their home province. Non-residents of Quebec are covered for collisions that occur in
Quebec but benefits are provided to them only to the extent that they are not
responsible for the accident. The decision of the Rdgie about the percentage of
responsibility may be contested in the courts.
The fund is financed from contributions from automobile owners, automobile drivers,
interest earned from the investment of accumulated funds and a portion of the taxes
collected under the Fuel Tax Act.
15. Andrews et aL v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd (1977-78), 3 C.C.L.T. 225; Arnold et al v. Teno
et al (1977-78), 3 C.C.L.T. 272; Thornton et aL v. Bd of School Trustees of School District
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not cover either injuries caused by themselves to third parties or
injuries caused to themselves by a driver carrying minimum
coverage.
The industry's response was to offer a rider known as S.E.E 42,
later replaced by S.E.F 44. S.E.F. 42 read in essence:
... the Insurer shall indemnify an insured person who sustains bodily
injury or death by accident arising out of the use or operation of an
automobile (by an underinsured or uninsured motorist) for the amount
such person is legally entitled to recover from the under-insured or
uninsured motorist whose vehicle caused the injury or death.1
6
S.E.E 42 was prefaced by a "brief explanation" which stated:
By this endorsement your Insurer provides additional benefits to you and
other insured persons who have a claim against another motorist for
injuries or death if the other motorist has insufficient insurance to pay the
claim. The limit of this coverage is the difference between the liability
insurance limit of your policy and that carried by the motorist at fault. For
example, if your policy shows a liability limit of $500,000 and you
obtained a judgment of $300,000 against the "at fault" motorist - but he
was insured for only $100,000, you would be able to claim the difference
of $200,000 from your Insurer. The coverage also applies if the "at fault"
motorist is not insured.
The infelicities 17 of the drafting raise questions about whether recourse
to the contraproferentum rules are appropriate, and whether, in a conflict
of laws situation involving a suit in another jurisdiction, the insurer was
guaranteeing to pay whatever was the unsatisfied judgment - even if it
was arrived at because of traditionally higher awards in the foreign forum
than might have been expected under the law governing the insurance
contract.
No. 57 (Prince George) et aL (1977-78), 3 C.C.L.T. 257. These cases are commented on by W.
H. Charles, A New Handbook on the Assessment of Damages and Personal Injury Cases from
the Supreme Court of Canada (1977-78) 3 C.C.L.T. 344.
16. Indemnity limited to the sum specified in the policy, in Canadian dollars.
17. S.E.F. 44 elaborated the earlier scheme by providing in clauses 5 and 6:
5. DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT AN ELIGIBLE CLAIMANT IS
LEGALLY ENTITLED TO RECOVER
(a) The amount that an eligible claimant is legally entitled to recover shall be
determined in accordance with the procedures set forth for determination of the
issues of quantum and liability by the uninsured motorist coverage provisions of
the policy.
(b) In determining the amount an eligible claimant is legally entitled to recover from
the inadequately insured motorist, issues of quantum shall be decided in
accordance with the law of the province governing the policy and issues of
liability shall be decided in accordance with the law of the place where the
accident occured.
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III. Solving the Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements Problem
- The Power ofAttorney and Undertaking
The old approach 18 of allowing direct enforcement of a local judgment
against the defendant's insurer was predicated on national insurers being
resident in all provinces. The growth of provincial crown agencies having
(c) In determining any amounts an eligible claimant is legally entitled to recover, no
amount shall be included with respect to pre-judgement interest accumulating
prior to notice as required by this endorsement.
(d) In determining any amounts an eligible claimant is legally entitled to recover, no
amount shall be included with respect to punitive, exemplary, aggravated or other
damages the award of which is based in whole or in part on the conduct of the
inadequately insured motorist or person jointly liable therewith, to the extent that
the said damages are not for the purpose of compensating the eligible claimant for
actually incurred losses.
(e) In determining any amounts an eligible claimant is legally entitled to recover from
an inadequately insured motorist as defined in paragraph l(e)(i), no amount shall
be included with respect to costs.
(f) No findings of a Court with respect to issues of quantum or liability are binding
on the Insurer unless the Insurer was provided with a reasonable opportunity to
participate in those proceedings as a party.
6. PROCEDURES
(a) The following requirements are conditions precedent to the liabililty of the Insurer
to the eligible claimant under this endorsement:
i) The eligible claimant shall promptly give written notice, with all available
particulars, of any accident involving injury or death to an insured person and of
any claim made on account of the accident;
ii) the eligible claimant shall, if so required, provide details of any policies of
insurance, other than life insurance, to which the eligible claimant may have
recourse;
iii) the eligible claimant and the insured person shall submit to examination under
oath, and shall produce for examination at such reasonable place and time as is
designated by the Insurer or its representative, all documents in their possession or
control that relate to the matters in question, and they shall permit extracts and
copies thereof to be made.
(b) Where an eligible claimant commences a legal action for damages for bodily
injury or death against any other person owning or operating an automobile
involved in the accident, a copy of the Writ of Summons or other initiating
process shall be delivered or sent by registered mail immediately to the chief
agency or head office of the Insurer in the province together with particulars of the
insurance and loss.
(c) Every action or proceeding against the Insurer for recovery under this
endorsement shall be commenced within 12 months from the date upon which the
eligible claimant or his legal representatives knew or ought to have known that the
quantum of the claims with respect to an insured person exceeded the minimum
limits for motor vehicle liability insurance in the jurisdiction in which the accident
occurred. No action which is commenced within two years of the date of the
accident shall be barred by this provision.
18. See supra, note 7.
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a monopoly of motor insurance in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British
Columbia and of personal injury coverage in Quebec heightened the
problems. It was possible for a judgment to be obtained against a
defendant in province A19 but to be unenforceable in province B where
the defendant resided and where his insurance company solely resided
and did business.
Superintendants and Registrars of Insurance have considerable powers
to regulate what will and will not be regarded as insurance sufficient to
comply with the laws of their jurisdiction. Foreign residents' insurance
will have to be satisfactory to the local registrar or superintendent.
Collectively the superintendents or registrars can bring considerable
power to bear on insurance companies by insisting on minimum
standards necessary for foreign insureds to drive in their jurisdiction
under the "pink-slip" scheme. As a result of an agreement between
insurers and the registrars or superintendents certain undertakings were
given by the insurers and incorporated in local legislation or regulations.
20
One might speculate whether construing such agreements against the
insurance industry is appropriate to cases where "gentle persuasion" has
been applied by government agencies or officers in order to secure the
agreement.
1. The Purpose
The purpose of the agreement between the insurers and superintendents/
registrars, and the consequent implementing legislation, is to require the
insurer to appear (and to give the superintendent/registrar an irrevocable
power of attorney to appear on the insurer's behalf)2°3and to deprive the
19. See supra, note 6.
20. E.g., see the new s. 93A added to the Nova Scotia Insurance Act, S.N.S. 1982, c. 31:
93A (1) In any action in the Province against an insurer transacting the business of
automobile insurance in the Province or its insured arising out of an automobile accident in the
Province, the insurer shall appear and shall not set up any defence to a claim under a contract
made outside the Province, including any defence as to the limit or limits of liability under the
contract, that might not be set up if the contract were evidenced by a motor vehicle liability
policy issued in the Province, and the contract made outside the Province shall be deemed to
include the benefits prescribed pursuant to Section 100D.
(2) In any action in another province against an insurer transacting the business of
automobile insurance in Nova Scotia or its insured arising out of an automobile accident in the
other province, the insurer shall appear and shall not set up any defence to a claim under a
contract evidenced by a motor vehicle liability policy issued in the other province.
(3) Where the Superintendent is satisfied that an insurer has failed to comply with the
provisions of this Section, he may issue an order directing the insurer to cease transacting the
business of automobile insurance in the Province.
20a. The power of attorney authorises any Registrar or Superintendent of Insurance who is a
party to the agreement to: "accept service of notice or process on its behalf" with respect to an
action or proceeding against it or its insured arising out of a motor-vehicle accident in any of
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insurer of the right to avail itself of a unique or unusual defence available
under the law governing the contract of insurance but not under the lex
fori. The classic type of situation is one in which a policy (often one
issued by a monopoly crown agency such as I.C.B.C. or its Manitoba or
Saskatchewan equivalents) contains a restriction on the validity of the
policy if the insured either falsely declares his place of residence2' or
changes his or her place of residence after taking out his insurance
policy.2 2 In the absence of the agreement devised by the superintendents
and registrars and the insurance industry, the defendant would be
uninsured as a result of a clause in the defendant's policy 3 and the
plaintiff would have to resort to the remedies provided by the uninsured
drivers fund. It is possible that the registrars and insurance industry were
trying to direct matters to be governed by the lex loci delicti. For instance
in Kolmatychi,24 s. 31(4) of the Manitoba Act,25 which restricts the
insurer to the defences to those in the lex fori, is prefaced by the words
"in an action in another province or territory of Canada against the
insurer.., arising out of the motor vehicle accident in that province or
territory". Thus the scheme may have envisaged that the lexfori and lex
loci delicti would be the same. In fact the legislation implementing the
reciprocal scheme elsewhere is not so narrowly drawn and moreover the
registrars may not have been aware of the width of some provincial ex
juris rules which could lead to a case being heard in a jurisdiction where
the defendant was not resident and in which the accident had not
occurred.26
the designated Provinces or Territories. The full text is set out in the decision in Van der Est
v State Farm (1983), 45 B.C.L.R. 133 at 135 (B.C.S.C.) This constitutes a basis under both the
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgements Acts and at common law for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment. See further Moore v Mercator Enterprises Ltd (1978), 90 D.L.R. (3d)
(N.S.T.D.)
21. Administrator, Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act v. Saskatchewan Government
Insurance Office, [1981] 4 W.W.R. 492 (Alta. C.A.).
23. Reinforced by s. 53 of The Manitoba Automobile Insurance Act, S.M. 1970, c. 102, as
amended, which states: "Where a vehicle designated in an owner's certificate is operated in
another province, state or country when the vehicle is required by the law of that province,
state or country to be registered or licenced in that province, state or country but is not
registered or licenced, that owner's certificate shall be deemed to have been revoked at the time
of the commencement of such operation."
24. Supra; note 22.
25. The Automobile Insurance Act, S.M. 1970, c.102, as amended.
26. See: Robinson v. Warren (1982), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 147 (C.A.) in which a plaintiff resident
in Alberta was injured in a motor accident there and sued in Nova Scotia where she was
convalescing at her parents' home. Service was effected on the defendant under N.S. C.P.R.
10.08. If Civil Procedure Rule 10.08 were held to be dealing with property and civil rights
outside the province it would be unconstitutional under the Rule in Royal Bank of Canada v.
The King [1913] A.C. 283 (J.C.P.C.).
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2. To What Does the Undertaking Apply?
In Shea v. Manitoba Public Insurance Policy27 the British Columbia
courts held that the undertaking to appear and not to raise defences other
than those arising under the lex fori only applied to liability policies.
Therefore Section B benefits (or no-fault benefits) were outside the ambit
of the undertaking, a fact that produced interesting consequences on the
actual facts of that case.28
It is important to study the purpose for which an undertaking was
given. In Van der Est v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company2 9
Wetmore, L.J.S.C. was unwilling to apply the "Power of Attorney and
Undertaking" given by the defendants to a B.C. plaintiff in an action
against a B.C. resident defendant. The accident had occurred in Hawaii
and State Farm was the insured of the rented car there. The judge felt that
the undertaking was intended to cover motor accidents in B.C. (e.g.
where a B.C. resident is injured by a State Farm-insured driving from the
continental U.S.A. into B.C.), bringing it outside the facts. This analysis
of the purpose of the power of attorney and undertaking seems to have
escaped the Ontario courts in Travelers Canada v. Macdonald0, which
involved severe injuries caused in Michigan to a passenger in a rented
van. Travelers was the insurer of the father's car on which the plaintiff, his
27. (1985), 20 C.C.L.T. 72 (B.C.C.A.). The point was not raised in Wardon v. McDonald
(1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 182 (Dist. CL) as the court followed the decision in MacDonald v.
Proctor (infra, note 34). In an action in Ontario by a Michigan insurer to recover no-fault
benefits paid to a Michigan insured it was held that the undertaking by the Michigan insurer
to appear in Ontario did not make the policy an Ontario policy whereby the payment of no-
fault benefits constituted a release of the defendant's liability.
28. The infant plaintiff, who was injured whilst a passenger in a car registered and insured in
Manitoba and operated by a B.C. licensed driver, obtained a judgment for $831,327 against
the owner and driver of the car. The owner carried a M.P.I.C. policy with a limit of $300,000
and the driver had an I.C.B.C. policy with a $200,000 limit. There was then an action in
relation to "no fault" benefits between M.P.I.C. and I.C.B.C. to decide how the losses should
be apportioned. Although M.P.I.C. had paid out the $300,000 limit on the policy ($2,000 by
way of medical expenses, $7,500 by way of ex gratia payment, $6,000 by way of disability
benefit and $284,000 paid into court), the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the
Manitoba regulation setting out the limit of liability only applied to liability for damages and
therefore M.P.LC. was liable to pay "no-fault" benefits in addition to the $300,000. Although
in both provinces "no-fault" benefits are deducted from the judgment (by way of an express
statutory exception to the Rule in Boarelli v. Flannigan, [1973] 3 O.R. 69 (C.A.)) and reduce
the liability of the insured to pay damages, they did not reduce the liability of the insurer to
pay the no-fault indemnity. Although the liability of the defendant in the tort action was
reduced by the "no-fault" benefits, the damages still exceeded the $300,000 limit on liability
coverage which M.P.I.C. was bound to pay. The no-fault benefits were payable in addition to
that sum. To compound M.P.I.C.'s problems, if the case had been heard in Manitoba costs
would have been apportioned between M.P.I.C. and I.C.B.C., but in British Columbia the
practice was to make the first insurer, M.P.I.C., pay in full.
29. (1983), 45 B.C.L.R. 133, (S.C.).
30. (1985), C.C.L.I. 314 (Ont. C.A.).
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daughter, was named as an occasional driver. General Accident was the
insurer of the van rented from Budget. Since Ontario cars were often
driven in the U.S.A., Travellers had made an agreement with the
Michigan Superintendent of Insurance to subject itself to the Michigan
Insurance Code which (i) provided benefits on a more generous scale
than in Ontario, and (ii) made the father's insurer rather than General
Accident primarily responsible. Although the Ontario Court of Appeal
held that the basic terms of the contract were governed by Ontario law,
they held that for accidents in Michigan the scope of the policy was
enlarged. The logic of allowing Michigan law to govern the extent of
liability of parties all of whom were normally resident in Ontario and the
priority between two Ontario insurers needs further scrutiny. In cases
where the lex loci delicti is fortuitous more sophisticated interest analyses
are possible.3
1
A related but not identical problem arose in Cooper Estate v.
Canadian Home Assurance Co. 3 2 A Nova Scotia resident was insured by
the appellants under a Nova Scotian policy of motor insurance that
contained the standard S.E.F 42 endorsement permitting the respondent
to claim back against his own insurer in the event of his suffering personal
injuries or death at the hands of an uninsured or under-insured motorist
up to an indemnity limit of $500,000. The insured, whilst crossing a road,
was hit and killed by a motorist resident in Florida carrying the Florida
minimum public insurance coverage of $10,000. Florida had no
unsatisfied judgment or similar fund. Despite allegations that the
respondent was intoxicated and had walked into the path of the Florida
driver, damages potentially could exceed the policy limits, particularly if
they were as assessed by Florida law. Even if they did not exceed the
policy limit the damages would probably be much higher if governed by
Florida law and procedure (including jury trial) than if governed by
Nova Scotia law. The respondent launched concurrent proceedings in
both Florida and Nova Scotia against the appellant. The Florida
proceedings were originally launched against the Florida motorist and
then the appellant was added as an additional party. During the course
of the appellant's successful application to restrain the respondents from
pursuing their Florida claim against the appellant (which is discussed in
more detail later) a question arose about whether Canadian Home had
submitted to the Florida court's jurisdiction. In 1971, by a director's
resolution, Canadian Home had given the Insurance Commission of
Florida a power of attorney to accept process arising out of a "motor
vehicle accident in Florida", and would "accept as final and binding any
31. See: Lewis v. Leigh et al, 54 O.R. (2d) 324 (C.A.).
32. (1986), 73 N.S.R. (2d) 230 (C.A.
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final judgment of any court... in Florida... in any action arising out
of a motor vehicle accident in the State of Florida". MacKeigan, J. A.
interpreted the resolution as "properly designed to ensure that Florida
persons and property can collect against foreign drivers under foreign
policies", 3 Le., that if a Florida resident had been injured in Florida by
a Nova Scotia insured and resident motorist the resolution would have
applied. It would n6t, by inference, be applied to a motor accident in
which a Nova Scotia resident was injured in Florida by a Florida resident
motorist and then sought to claim back on his Nova Scotian insurance
from a Canadian company.
3. Does the Undertaking Alter the Law Governing the Policy from That
of the Issuing Province to That of the Lex Fori?
This issue has arisen in a number of cases.34 In the case of MacDonald v.
Proctor35 the plaintiff was injured in a car driven by Elizabeth Sneyd and
owned by George Sneyd. However the Sneyds were not at fault because
they had been hit by another car driven by Proctor. The plaintiff's special
damages were $62,583 and in addition general damages of $142,714
were payable. The plaintiff, although suing in Ontario, was a Manitoba
resident and insured with the Manitoba Public Insurance Corp. Pursuant
to her policy she received disability benefits of $18,000 and the question
arose whether she should have these payments deducted from her
damages.
If all the elements of the case had involved Ontario law, ss. 231 and
237 of the Ontario Insurance Act 35a would have apparently authorised
the deduction of the disability benefits. The Manitoba legislation
appeared to be similar but was not pleaded as a defence, which perhaps
was unfortunate. However s. 200(1) of the Ontario Act apparently
restricted the applicability of ss. 231 and 237 to contracts of insurance
made or renewed in Ontario. Thus the Manitoba payments fell outside
the terms of the insurers' undertaking and couldn't be read as
incorporating into extraprovincial policies all the terms that an Ontario
33. Id, at 233, para. 17.
34. See, eg., Corbett v. Coop Fire and Casualty Co. (1984), 9 C.C.L.I. 300 (Atla. Q.B.), and
MacDonald v. Proctor (1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 169 (S.C.C.) dismissing an appeal from
(1977), 86 D.L.R. (3d) 455 (Ont. C.A.).
35. Id See also: Waldon v. McDonald (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 1986 (Dist. C.) a case in which
Waldon's Michigan insurer had paid no-fault benefits and then instituted a subrogated claim
in Ontario against the defendant for the benefits. The Court held that the undertaking by the
Michigan insurer to appear in Ontario and not to set up certain defences there did not make
the policy an Ontario policy so as to make the payment of no-fault benefits a release of the
defendant's liability.
35a. R.S.O. 1980, c. 218.
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policy was obliged to contain. As Zuber J. A.36 observed, "an
undertaking by the Manitoba Public Insurance Corporation to, in effect,
observe Ontario rules to a certain extent, where its insured is involved in
Ontario proceedings, does not render the Manitoba policy 'made in
Ontario'." It should be emphasised that the point made in Shea37 about
the undertaking only applying to "liability policies" was not addressed in
this case.
Whilst it may have been desirable that "no-fault" benefits paid under
an insurance policy, wherever it was made, should be deductible from an
Ontario liability award, a narrow constructionist approach will prevent
that result. Perhaps, then, a better approach would have been to construe
the legislation so as to avoid a "false conflict" that might give a plaintiff
an advantage she would not have if all the events occurred in Manitoba
or Ontario.
Similar points arose in Corbett v. Coop Fire Casualty Co.38, where an
accident in British Columbia was caused by an Albertan resident driving
a vehicle insured in Alberta. The court was called upon to decide:
i) Were the plaintiffs who had obtained a judgment in B.C.
entitled to prejudgment interest?
ii) Were the plaintiffs entitled to post-judgment interest at more
than 5% under Alberta law?
iii) Were the no-fault benefits governed by the B.C. Insurance Act
rather than under the Alberta legislation?
iv) Were additional no-fault benefits payable under awarding
legislation in Alberta that first came into force three months
after the accident?
The court held that the British Columbia provisions governing
prejudgment interest only covered I.C.B.C. policies; the plaintiffs' claim
actually arose under the terms of the Alberta Insurance Act which
governed "no-fault benefit". The Alberta policy was not to be treated as
one "made in British Columbia", nor was the Alberta amendment
intended to have retrospective effect to accidents occurring before its
passage. On the question of post-judgment interest, the defendants were
ordered to pay this as a "just debt" under the Alberta Act.
Although the terms of the policy generally remain those of the issuing
province, including the ceiling on liability, such a defence will not apply
where the lexfori has fixed a higher minimum level of liability than that
of the issuing province. Moreover the coverage may have increased in
36. MacDonaldv. Proctor, supra, note 34 at 458.
37. Supra, note 27.
38. Supra, note34.
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terms of the persons covered. In Cunningham et aL v. The Manitoba
Public Insurance Corp.39 Cunningham was injured in an accident in
British Columbia. The owner and driver was a Manitoba resident and
insured by the defendant. In a B.C. action Cunningham sought her
damages from the defendant only to have the defendant raise the issue
that the Manitoba policy did not provide coverage for motorcycle
passengers. If the claim had been pursued in Manitoba it would have
failed. However by suing in British Columbia the plaintiff succeeded. The
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that, though in a B.C. policy the
possibility of excluding motorcycle passenger coverage existed, "the
manner" 40 of the application of the law of British Columbia prevented
such a policy from being issued in British Columbia at that time. Since
the plaintiff was a resident of Prince George, B.C. there was no element
of her "forum shopping" in a forum with which she had no connection.
However the terms of the undertaking indicate a possibility of forum
shopping if the plaintiff lives in Manitoba and only sues in B.C. to get
around the "Manitoba defence". It is not clear how much attention was
given to avoid an incentive to forum shop when the undertaking was
drafted.
IV. Phillips v. Eyre4' and Its Application in Interprovincial Motor
Insurance Cases
The rule in Phillips v. Eyre is only applicable in cases involving foreign
torts. Of the two heads, the first, actionability under the lex fori, was
traditionally the more important. All sorts of devices were used to
minimize the importance of the second- head justifiability under the lex
loci delicti. In McLean v. Pettigrew42 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that even though no civil liability existed under the lex loci delicti
(Ontario) and the defendant had been acquitted of any provincial offence
under Ontario law, there was nevertheless no justifiability under the
second head of Phillips v. Eyre. The judgment goes close to upholding the
right of the forum to second guess the lex loci delicti and to holding that
regardless of any decision of the courts in the loci delicti, the very fact that
an accident occurred means that some fault must have existed. The
general tenor of the decision in that case and subsequent ones is that the
39. [197915 W.W.R. 397 (B.C.C.A.).
40. Such a policy would have to be approved, including the form of the exclusion, and no such
approval existed. Until the approval was obtained no policy containing an exclusion could be
used.
41. (1870), L.R. 6 Q.B. 1. See further McLeod, The Conflict of Laws, (Calgary: Carswells,
1983), at 546 etseq.
42. [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 (S.C.C.).
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first head of Phillips v. Eyre is the more important of the two heads.
Although the reasoning in McLean v. Pettigrew43 :
i) is difficult to reconcile with the apparent interpretation of
"justifiability" in Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
decisions";
ii) seems to rest heavily on the much criticised and probably wrongly
decided45 decision in Machado v. Fontes46; and
iii) seems to represent a high water mark in "homeward trendism" 47;
it is nevertheless correctly decided on its facts, though not for the reasons
given. In essence there was no reason to apply Ontario law to an accident
between Quebec residents driving from Montreal to Ottawa which
fortuitously took place in Ontario. The parties could just as easily have
driven up the Quebec side of the Ottawa River. This "point of contact"
type of reasoning can be found in a line of American cases48 and in the
House of Lords recognition in Boys v. Chaplin49 that, though as a general
rule there had to be given recognition to the lex loci delicti, and that civil
liability had to exist for the particular head of damages50 claimed, there
could be exceptions to that rule. There was simply no reason in Boys v.
Chaplin to apply Maltese law to an accident in Malta between two
English51 servicemen serving in Malta. Nor was the plaintiff seeking to
"forum shop" unfairly by suing a defendant in his jurisdiction of ordinary
residence. If the plaintiff had been Maltese and had been trying to gain
substantially different heads of damage (and thus greater recovery) than
those available in the lex loci delicti, it might have been a different matter.
The need for a policy analysis and understanding of tort principles in
a conflict of laws context, even if this means modification of the Phillips
v. Eyre principle, was partially appreciated by the Ontario Court of
43. Id
44. E.g., C.PR. v. Parent [1917] A.C. 195; Walpole v. Canadian Northern Railway Company,
[1923] A.C. 113 and McMillan, [1923] A.C. 120. The assumption by the forum that some
offence must have occured in the lex loci delicti was just what the Judicial Committee declined
to assume in those cases.
45. See the attitude of the House of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin, [1969] 2All E.R. 1085.
46. [1897] 2 Q.B. 231 (C.A.).
47. For a "revenge!' case in which Ontario unreasonably discounted the impact of the Quebec
lex loci delict see Going v.Reid (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201 (H.C.).
48. E.g., Babcock v. Jackson (1963), 12 N.Y. (2d) 473.
49. [1971] A.C. 356.
50. Thus preventing the manipulation of the procedure/substance distinction by the forum to
override the lex loci delicti by saying that once some liability existed under the lex loc all
matters of damages, whether heads of damage or qualification, become a procedural matter for
determination by the forum. For the suggestion that remoteness of damage is a substantive
matter in a contract case see D'AImeida v. Sir Frederick Becker Co., [1953] 2 Q.B. 329.
51. For a possible complication, if one or both of the parties had been Scots residents see
McElroy v. McAllister, [1949] S.C. 110.
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Appeal in the recent case of Lewis v. Leigh et al.52 Two automobile
accidents took place in Quebec involving Ontario residents53 and the
main question was the extent to which the Quebec Automobile
Insurance Act was applicable.
Grange J. A. described 4 the salient features of the Quebec Act55 :
... it provided personal injury insurance without fault for all residents of
Quebec. It set up an insurer known as the Rigie de l'Assurance
Automobile du Quebec (the 'Rdgie') to make ayments to injured persons
according to a set scale. Action in the courts of Quebec was forbidden to
those persons (indeed to any person). The Act also required the Rigie to
compensate non-residents of Quebec who were injured in that province
but only to the extent they were not at fault. The Rigie, under the Act,
after compensating a victim of an accident in Quebec, was entitled to
recover from a wrongdoer who was not resident of Quebec to the extent
that the wrongdoer was responsible for the Quebec accident.
These rights were to be in lieu of a civil legal remedy by the victim. A
victim not responsible for the accident in Quebec would be compensated
by the Quebec Rigie unless an agreement existed between the Rigie and
the competent authorities of the place of residence of the victim.
The Quebec scheme produced problems for an Ontario resident
driving in Quebec (unless he was driving a vehicle registered in Quebec)
as he was not entitled to benefits to the extent that he was at fault in the
accident (s. 8). Moreover, the Rigie reserved the right to pursue him to
recover the moneys paid out (s. 9).
To resolve these problems, the Rdgie and the Minister of Consumer
and Commercial Relations for Ontario entered into a Memorandum of
52. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 324.
53. A third accident took place in Quebec but involved New Brunswick residents.
54. Id, at 326 etseq.
55. The relevant sections of the Act (L.Q. 1977, c. 68) are as follows:
4. The indemnities provided for in this title are in the place and stead of all rights,
recourses and rights of action of any one by reason of bodily injury caused by an
automobile and no action in that respect shall be admitted before any court of justice.
8. The victim of an accident that occurred in Quebec who is not resident therein shall
be compensated by the Rdgie under this title to the extent that he is not responsible for
the accident unless otherwise agreed between the Rigie and the competent authorities
of the place of residence of such victims.
9. Notwithstanding section 4, the Rdgie, where it compensates a victim by reason of
an accident that occurred in Quebec, is subrogated in the victim's rights and is entitled
to recover the indemnities and the capital representing the pensions that the Rigie is
thereby required to pay from any person not resident in Quebec who is responsible for
such accident to the extent that he is responsible therefor and from any person liable for
compensation of bodily injury caused in the said accident of such non-resident.
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Agreement 56 providing that any Ontario resident having automobile
insurance issued in Ontario was to be paid by his insurer for an accident
occurring in Quebec an amount equal to all benefits payable under the
Quebec Automobile Insurance Act regardless of fault.'The Rigie would
not compensate any Ontario resident entitled to such payment and the
Rigie waived its right of subrogation against such persons.
The Minister implemented the agreement in Ontario by causing
Ontario Regulation 1004/78 to be promulgated. It added a Part III to
what was then Schedule E of the Insurance Act57 entitled "Supplemen-
tary Benefits Respecting Accidents Occurring in Quebec" and essentially
provided that the insurer would pay to an insured who suffered an
accident in Quebec the same amount as would be provided to him under
that province's Automobile Insurance Act.58
Grange J. A. categorised the two considerations before the Court as:
1. Does the law of Ontario now incorporate the Quebec scheme of
compensation for accidents occurring in Quebec?
56. The relevant parts of the Memorandum are as follows:
1.1 WHEREAS by virtue of article 8 of the Automobile Insurance Act (L.Q. 1977,
c. 68) the victim of an automobile accident that occurred in Quebec who is not resident
therein is compensated by the Rigie to the extent that he is not responsible for the
accident unless otherwise agreed between the Rigie and the competent authority of the
place of residence of such a victim.
1.5 AND WHEREAS it is the desire of both parties that the resident of Ontario,
other than the uninsured, who is a victim of an automobile accident occurring in
Quebec, be entitled to compensation on the same basis as a resident of Quebec and that
his legal liability for such an accident be no greater than that of a Quebec resident.
2.2.1 The Minister shall cause to be made, by regulation, an amendment to Schedule
E of the InsuranceAct (R.S.O. 1970, c. 224), so that:
(i) A Part III is added to subsection 2 of the said Schedule which shall provide for
the compensation of the insured resident of Ontario who suffers bodily injury in an
accident occurring in Quebec by the insurer who issued the automobile insurance
contract and this according to the provision of the Automobile Insurance Act (L.Q.
1977, c. 68) and its Regulations as may be amended from time to time, regardless of
who is at fault.
2.2.2. The Rigie shall not compensate any resident of Ontario who is entitled to
receive compensation from insurer by virtue of the Part III of Subsection 2 of Schedule
E.
2.3.1. Subject to paragraphs 2.3.2. and 2.3.3. hereafter, the Rigie waives the exercise
of any right of subrogation it may have, against a resident of Ontario involved in an
accident, by virtue of article 9 of the Automobile Insurance Act (L.Q. 1977, c. 68).
57. R.S.O. 1970, c.224.
58. The operative clause reads as follows:
B. With respect to bodily injury, as a result of an accident, to a person insured in
Quebec the insurer agrees to make payments under this Part in the same amount and
form and subject to the same conditions as if such person were a resident of Quebec as
defined in the Automobile Insurance Act (Quebec) and the regulations made under that
Act and entitled to payments under that Act and those regulations.
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2. If the answer to question 1 is no, should the law of Ontario or that of
Quebec be applied to the three actions now brought in Ontario?
He considered that:
It is possible that the provinces intended to reduce the insured person's
recovery to what he would get under Quebec law - Article 1.5 of the
memorandum might be so read - but an agreement between
governments or government agencies has no binding effect on the citizens
until converted into legislation (see: Reference re Anti-Inflation Act,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 373; 9 N.R. 541), and that legislation has not been
forthcoming.
In my view, this case really resolves itself into a problem in the conflict
of laws - specifically, a question of the choice of law in an action in
which the courts of Ontario have jurisdiction. And there can be no
question that Ontario has jurisdiction to try cases (subject to
considerations of the forum conveniens) where the defendant resides in
and is served in Ontario.
The court justified the result by reference to Babcock v. Jackson 9 and
Boys v. Chaplin.60 The reasoning, however, was justified mainly by
reference to McLean v. Pettigrew which, though it was felt to be worth
re-examination, was said to be binding.61
The approach in this case contrasts strongly with the earlier decision in
Going v. Reid62 which involved a motor vehicle accident in Quebec
involving a Quebec resident defendant. The plaintiffs and corporate
defendant resided in Ontario. The result of the decision was to apply the
rule in Phillips v. Eyre as interpreted in McLean v. Pettigrew,6s but with
an inadequate discussion of the other case law, in such a way as to expose
the Quebec resident to liability where no such liability existed under
Quebec law after the advent of the Rigie . The process involved holding
that, as the obverse of McLean v. Pettigrew, in the eyes of the Ontario
Court, the Quebec defendant in driving on the wrong side of the road
must have breached the Quebec Highway Traffic Acm and his act was
therefore "unjustifiable" under the second head of Phillips v. Eyre. There
was even a suggestion of an alternative argument that since the defendant
was still liable under Quebec law for property damage caused to the
plaintiffs, a defence under Quebec law merely pertaining to personal
injuries would not make the defendant's actions "justifiable". Although
this argument purported to be consistent with the actual result in Boys v.
Chaplin65, it seems to miss the fact that a majority of the law lords were
59. Supra, note48.
60. Supra note 49.
61. See supra note 44 for doubts about this.
62. (1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 201 (H.C.).
63. Supr, note 42.
64. R.S.Q. 1977, c. 24.
65. Supra, note 49.
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talking about the need for recovery under the lex loci delicti for the
particular head of damage claimed (as a general rule, though the rule was
subject to exceptions).
The decision attracted trenchant and justified criticism from Professor
John Swan66, cited in Lewis v. Leigh67. It should henceforth be treated
with caution.
V. Judicial and Legislative Attitudes and Responses to the Quebec
Scheme
Most provinces have reached a governmental agreement with Quebec to
protect the Rigie from claims outside Quebec in respect of Quebec
accidents caused by residents in other Canadian provinces covered by the
agreement, and who were covered by automobile insurance in their own
province of residence. Such persons were to receive from their own
insurers an amount equal to the benefits paid by the Rigie regardless of
proof of fault.68 The corollary was that Quebec residents suffering bodily
injury in an accident in Manitoba were to be compensated in accordance
with the Automobile Insurance Act of Quebec regardless of fault.69 The
precise scope of that agreement has already been discussed in relation to
Lewis v. Leigh,70 but it would be wrong to think that the attitude of the
courts or the legislatures has been one of unqualified acceptance of the
66. (1985), 63 Can. Bar Review at 271, esp. 309-10.
The decision in Going threatens every Quebec resident by making him or her subject
to Ontario law if they are so unlucky as to hit an Ontario resident. It is worth noting
that the rule of Phillips v. Eyre as applied in Going is so forum-centred that the rule
would not differentiate between a claim made by an Ontario resident and one made by
a Quebec (or for that matter a New York) resident. Any plaintiff could recover full
common law damages in Ontario. It is a poor excuse for these results to say that in
many cases the Ontario judgment would not be enforceable outside Ontario; the clear
potential for unfair and unjustified treatment of Quebec residents exists.
See also the subsequent case of Ang et al v. Trach et al (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 90 (Ont. H.C.)
where an Ontario resident was successfully able to sue in Ontario for a motor vehicle accident
caused in Quebec by a Quebec driver. Henry J. recognised the criticism that had been levelled
at Going v Reid and similar cases on Phillips v Eyre, but felt bound to follow McLean v
Pettigrew [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 rather than the "double actionability" test propounded in other
cases. The result of the decision is unworthy of a court in a federal nation in that it deprives
the Quebec resident of a defence under the law of his residence and in which the accident took
place. There is an element of colonialism that applies Ontario law, including the provisions of
the Family Law Reform Act which allows dependants to claim damages, to an accident in
Quebec caused by a Quebecer. If Ontario law was being applied to "property and civil rights
outside the Province" it would be vulnerable to objection under Royal Bank of Canada v The
King [1913] A.C. 299.
67. Supra, note 52.
68. See e-g., cl. 2.2.1 of the Agreement between Manitoba Public Insurance Corp. and the
Rigie de l'Assurance Automobile du Quebec dated 25 Jan. 1979.
69. Id, cl. 2.2.6.
70. Supra, note 52.
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Quebec scheme. In Perron v. Parise7' the plaintiff passenger was injured
in a motor accident in Quebec and sued the defendant. Both parties were
residents in New Brunswick. The defendant unsuccessfully sought to raise
the defence under s. 266(2) of the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act 72
which precluded a plaintiff from having in New Brunswick "a greater
right of recovery resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
(in New Brunswick) than that person would have in the jurisdiction in
which he ordinarily resides".
Deschenes J. had little difficulty holding that since the plaintiff resided
in New Brunswick the section did not operate to deprive him of the
higher damages available in New Brunswick and did not substitute
instead the Quebec "no-fault" compensation with its consequent limit on
damages. However the interesting question is why the New Brunswick
legislature should have legislated a "revenge" section to prevent Quebec
residents injured in New Brunswick from being able to recover higher
benefits in a New Brunswick negligence action that they would have
recovered in Quebec under the no-fault scheme.
The background explanation for this provision is found in an
annotation by Professor Walsh.73
Insurers in the common law provinces were concerned that their policy-
holders should be denied no-fault protection when visiting Quebec yet
limited to the no-fault scale of recovery. They also were upset at the loss
of control over the settlement of claims effected by the interposition of the
Rigie . Their unhappiness with the new regime was exacerbated by the
fact that it purported to give Quebec residents injured abroad access to
both the tort and no-fault compensation worlds.
The way this "grudge" 74 legislation works can be seen in Morin and
Faucher v. Essiembre.75 Two Quebec resident plaintiffs were injured in a
motor accident in New Brunswick caused by the defendant, a New
Brunswick resident. After recovering on a no-fault basis for their injuries
from the Rigie, the plaintiffs then sued the defendant in New Brunswick.
They failed. They were restricted to the recovery a New Brunswicker
could have received in Quebec. Moreover, it was suggested that a
Quebec plaintiff would be entitled to recover tort damages, even on the
lower no-fault scale, only when he sued in New Brunswick prior to
seeking compensation from the Rdgie. Professor Walsh neatly points out
the plaintiff's dilemma:76
71. (1983), 44 N.B.R. (2d) 409 (Q.B.).
72. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-17.
73. (1984), 55 N.B.R. 443 at 445, para. 7.
74. Id, para. 10 (Professor Walsh's word).
75. 1984(51) N.B.R. (2d) 314 (Q.B.)
76. Supra note 73, para. 15.
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When, as the plaintiffs in Morin had done, he chose to first exercise his
right to collect compensation from the Rigie in Quebec, tort recovery was
precluded altogether. In such a case, the real party in interest in the
litigation was the Regie by virtue of its right of subrogation to the victim's
rights of action under the les loci delicti against a non-resident tortfeasor.
In Deschene, J.'s opinion, section 266(2) operated to deny the Rdgie any
such right of reimbursement because, as the defendant's expert witness
testified, "subrogated claims of (New Brunswick) insurers were not
payable by la Rigie.
Walsh criticises s. 266(2) as first, an ineffective attempt to improve the
compensation of New Brunswickers in Quebec, and second, as
interpreted in Morin, as a denial of any right in the Regie to seek
reimbursement because, as the defendant's expert witnesses testified,
"subrogated claims of (New Brunswick) insurers were not payable by la
Rigie ". This latter point she asserts misses the essence of subrogation.
She points out 77 that from a reading of the section as a whole it was not
intended to bar the insurer's action. Finally she indicates that such a
provision may infringe the equality provisions in the Charter by denying
the equal benefit of the local law to non-resident accident victims. 78
After the fairly unsympathetic treatment of Quebec law in Going v.
Reid,79 a further decision of the Ontario courts in Duncan v. Mayhew8 °
was arguably more in accord with the exhortation in the Interpretation
Acts to give statutes a remedial interpretation. The plaintiff, an Ontario
resident, was seriously injured in an automobile accident in Quebec
which he had been the occupant of a stolen car. The driver who caused
the accident had stolen the car in Ontario and at the time of the accident
was attempting to evade the Quebec police. Both the owner of the stolen
car and the driver resided in Ontario. The plaintiff attempted to recover
the no-fault benefits from:
(i) the insurer of the owner of the car;
(ii) his own father's insurer who had issued a standard Ontario policy in
respect of the father's car; and
(iii) the Rigie.
The two Ontario insurers agreed that as between the insurer of the stolen
car and the plaintiff's father's insurer, the insurer of the stolen car was the
first loss insurer.
The Ontario insurers, however, raised the defence under the Ontario
policy that an occupant was not entitled to section B benefits if the car
was being used without the consent of the owner. But the effect of this
exclusion in the standard Ontario policy was allegedly affected by the
77. Id, para. 17.
78. Id, para. 19.
79. Supra, note 62.
80. (1983), 3 C.C.L.I. 138 (Ont. H.C.).
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introduction of the no-fault recovery scheme by the Automobile
Insurance Act of Quebec and the conclusion of an agreement between
the Ontario Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations and the
Rdgie dated Dec. 27, 1978.
Eberle J. held, as have later judges,8' that a memorandum concluded
by the Crown did not of itself bind its subjects. But since the salient terms
had been placed verbatim in valid Ontario regulations, these had a force
of law entirely absent from the agreement. The case was treated as one
outside the operation of conflicts rules such as the rule in Phillips v. Eyre,
and simply involving the proper interpretation of the policy in light of the
prevailing Ontario Insurance Act and regulations. Although there was a
general exception for recovery for loss arising from the use of a stolen car,
a new Part III, added at the end of Subsection 2 of Section B, obligated
the insurer to pay to the insured resident in Ontario the same benefits he
would receive under the Quebec Automobile Insurance Act if he were a
resident of Quebec. The general exclusion for losses arising from the use
of a stolen car was qualified by the words "except as provided in Part III
of Subsection 2" (which specifically governed accidents in Quebec). The
general exceptions and conditions were in any event qualified by the
words "in so far as applicable". Since the Quebec Act had no provision
denying compensation where a person was injured by a stolen car there
was no basis for giving effect to the general conditions in the policy that
were not intended to apply to the specific case.
In addition, by way of an alternate ratio decidendi Eberle J. held that
though the whole Ontario/Quebec Agreement had not been given force
of law, it was nevertheless an agreement within s. 8 of the Quebec Act,
which provided that a victim of an accident in Quebec who was not
resident there, was entitled to compensation from the Rigie "unless
otherwise agreed between the Rigie and the Competent Authorities of
the place of residence of such victim". Since the agreement was valid
between the parties, and the Rigie, by entering into the Agreement, had
done all it could to protect itself, it was entitled to a defence under s. 8
of the Quebec Act. Although the judge did not elaborate on how Quebec
law becomes relevant, it seems implicit that Quebec law gives a complete
defence to an action in tort in such circumstances and that the action
would be justifiable under the second head of the rule of Phillips v. Eyre.
This is consistent with the new interpretation of that head in Boys v.
Chaplin82 and even with the old Judicial Committee decisions in Walpole
and MacMillan83, though less easily so with McLean v. Pettigrew.8
4
8 1. See:'Lewis v. Leigh, supra, note 52.
82. Supra, note 49.
83. Supra note 44.
84. Supra, note 42, and by inference Lewis v. Leigh, supra note 52. Also Lewis v. Leigh does
not pursue Duncan v. Mayhew's treatment of the agreement as a defence.
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VI. Conflicts Problems of Insurance Rider S.E.E 42 - Cooper v.
Canadian Home
85
The proper approach to the interpretation of the voluntary additions to
motor vehicle insurance policies, and whether the conflict of laws
repercussions were adequately considered when drafting clauses
primarily intended for use in the jurisdiction of the insured's habitual
residence, emerges in the Cooper case. The mechanical transference of
rules intended for local application to conflict of laws situations is not
without risk, and it is to the court's credit that these risks did not go
unnoticed.
In February, 1984, Richard James Cooper, a member of the Canadian
Armed Forces who normally resided in Nova Scotia, was temporarily in
Florida. As he crossed a state highway on the evening of February 14, he
was struck and killed by an automobile operated by Julie K. Silecchia, a
resident of Florida. Silecchia had public liability insurance coverage of
$10,000.00 (U.S.). Apparently, Florida had no unsatisfied judgment or
similar fund. Silecchia's assets were unknown but seemed unlikely to be
significant.
Liability for the death was in dispute. A local police report tended to
absolve Silecchia; the deceased was allegedly intoxicated and had walked
into the path of the vehicle. Another police eye-witness, however,
suggested Silecchia was not keeping proper lookout.
The respondents were Mr. Cooper's estate and his widow and infant
children. They resided in Nova Scotia where Mr. Cooper had been
employed and where his estate would be administered. Mr. Cooper held
a motor vehicle liability insurance policy with Canadian Home. The
policy had a standard "S.E.F. 42 endorsement". The insuring clause in the
endorsement stated:
... the Insurer shall indemnify an insured person who sustains bodily
injury or death by accident arising out of the use or operation of an
automobile (by an uninsured or under-insured motorist) for the amount
such person is legally entitled to recover from.86
The policy contained an arbitration clause:
If any difference arises between the insured person and the Insurer as to
whether the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages and, if so
entitled, as to the amount thereof these questions shall be submitted to
arbitration of some person to be chosen by both parties, or if they cannot
agree on one person, then by two persons, one to be chosen by the insured
person and the other by the Insurer, and a third person to be appointed by
82. Supra, note 32.
86. Indemnity limited to $500,000.00 (Can.)
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the persons so chosen. The submission shall be subject to the provisions of
the Arbitration Act and the award shall be binding upon the parties.87
An action by the plaintiffs was launched against the defendant
Silecchia in Florida and shortly thereafter the defendant's insurance
company was added to the Florida proceedings. Shortly before Canadian
Home was added to the Florida proceedings the plaintiff sued the
defendants in Nova Scotia.
Various issues emerged. It appeared that the Florida claims would
have permitted damages more generous as to beneficiaries and greater as
to quantum than the Nova Scotia ones. Was it a correct interpretation of
the Nova Scotian contract insurance that the Nova Scotia insurer agreed
to pay whatever damages a Florida injury might award and which
Silecchia, the negligent driver, was unable to pay? Or did the reference to
liability in the arbitration clause refer to liability under the contract, thus
permitting a Nova Scotian court to impose different heads of damage and
different quanta than a Florida court? If twin brothers (both Nova Scotia
residents) in identical family and financial circumstances had been killed
(one in Nova Scotia and the other in Florida), would policy be well
served by encouraging the estate of the one killed in Florida to forum
shop88 (Le., sue in Florida and recover more than the one suing in Nova
Scotia)?
Faced with these possibilities the defendants were ultimately able to
secure an order from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal restraining the
plaintiff from further prosecuting her Florida claim against Canadian
Home. She was, of course, free to sue Silecchia there.
Canadian Home would ultimately have to face the possibility that its
undertaking to appear and defend in Florida (given to the Insurance
Commission of Florida) was a submission for the purposes of
enforcement.8 9 However, what constitutes submission is for the enforcing
rather than rendering court to determine, and in the view of the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal the undertaking was properly designed to protect
Florida accident victims, not Nova Scotians having recourse against their
own insurers under a Nova Scotia contract.90 The Court of Appeal
decided, quoting McLeod, 9' but not the latest House of Lords
87. By implication, the Nova Scotia Arbitration Act in a Nova Scotia context.
88. "As moths are drawn to the light so are litigants to the United States" per Lord Denning
in Smith, Kline & French v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72 at 82 (C.A.). See further E. Edinger,
The MacShannon Test for Discretion" Defence and Delimination (1986), 64 Can. Bar Rev.
283; JJ. Fawcett, LisAlibiPendens and theDiscretion to Stay (1984), 47 Mod. L.R. 481.
89. See, supra, the text to note 27 etseq and especially the text to note 32.
90. Le, one giving rights if a negligent driver was under-insured or uninsured.
91. Conflict of Laws, (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 119-120.
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authorities,92 that "the plaintiffs action was vexatious, oppressive and an
abuse of process".
The question of whether the arbitration remedy should have been
followed first was regarded as premature since in the Court's view the
duty to arbitrate was hardly relevant until the Cooper estate established
a claim against Silecchia. The Court did, however, suggest that the
question of law in this case, the major issue, was likely to be better
answered by a judge than an adjuster or arbitrator.93
VII. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the various agreements and undertakings, their
reduction to statutory forum and some of the voluntary riders in
insurance policies are very complex. The courts have expressed various
cries of anguish. Perhaps the most dramatic are from the Shea line of
cases.94 The expense of this case alone speaks volumes for the
(unnecessary) complexity of this area of law. In the second trial decision
95
dated December 21, 1984. Bouck J. noted that:
92. E.g., Rockware v. MacShannon [1978] 2 W.L.R. 362.
93. Supra note 32.
94. Shea v. Shea et al, [1983] 6 W.W.R. 340 (B.C.S.C.); Shea et aL v. M.PIC., [1985] 2
W.W.R. 652 (B.C.S.C.); Shea v. Shea et aL, [1985) 6 W.W.R. 641 (B.C.C.A.).
95. See the comments of Bouck J. at [1983] 6 W.W.R. 340 at 341 and 343.
Reasons for judgment were handed down in these actions on 21st April and 26th May
1983 ([1983] 1 L.R. 1-676). Difficulties occurred with respect to settling the exact
terms of the orders. On 27th July 1983 counsel for the plaintiff and M.P.I.C (Manitoba
Public Insurance Corporation) appeared to argue their differences. For reasons that
were not made entirely clear to me, counsel for Michael James Shea and I.C.B.C.
(Insurance Corporation of British Columbia) chose not to appear.
On 18th August 1983 1 revised my reasons for judgment dated 26th May 1983. After
further reflection I discovered several discrepancies in the reasons dated 18th August
1983 (1983] B.C.W.L.D. 1879, S.C., Nanaimo Nos. SC2654, SC3102 & SC3147 (not
yet reported)) and accordingly must issue this judgment in place of reasons dated 26th
May 1983 and 18th August 1983....
Having considered the submissions made by the parties on 21st, 22nd April and 27th
July 1983, and after reviewing my reasons dated 26th May 1983, I am satisfied I did
not completely understand the complexity of the matters hinted at by counsel. During
the course of argument on 21st and 22nd April and 27th July 1983, counsel put
forward a bewildering number of submissions which were sometimes abandoned and
later partly resurrected. What were the precise defences to the claims or no-fault
benefits never became entirely clear. As a result I did not get any firm grasp of the
various oral arguments made by counsel. Nonetheless I must assume the blame for not
holding counsel to a consistent and unequivocal position. As a result of this confusion
I propose to analyze the issues once more in this judgment. For the sake of clarity, I
withdraw what I said in the reasons dated 26th May 1983 and 18th August 1983 and
substitute this judgment in it place.
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James Michael Shea. is now six-years-old. He was not quite two months
of age on 19 December 1978 when he was severely injured while riding
as a passenger with his mother and father.
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Bouck J. had already stated on August 26, 1983:
All I can tell from the record before me is that these two gigantic insurers,
M.P.I.C. and I.C.B.C., are locked into a bitter fight over who will pay and
no-fault benefits to the infant plaintiff. In the meantime, the plight of this
badly injured child and his parent is forgotten. They have been left begging
for assistance. It is a situation legislature specifically set out to avoid.
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The main issue in that latter trial was an action between the two
provincial insurers, M.P.I.C. and I.C.B.C., to determine which of them
was to bear the loss including interest and taxed costs.
In Shea there were two trials totalling four days of hearing plus a
Court of Appeal decision. In the case of Cooper v. Canadian Home
98
there was a Chamber Application and Court of Appeal hearing in Nova
Scotia supplemented by various interlocutory hearings in Florida, with
the possibility of a trial against the negligent driver there, even if the
defendant insurer in Nova Scotia took no part in those proceedings. This
is clearly not calculated to minimize costs.
It is difficult to glean any golden thread running consistently through
these cases but it appears that Perron v. Parise,99 Van der Est v. State
Farml°° and Cooper v. Canadian Home'01 all involve cases where
potentially applicable conflicts rules, on a closer examination of the facts
and governmental interests involved, have been found to be inapplicable.
This sort of approach marks a move away from mechanically applying
rules such as the one in Phillips v. Eyre. The reasoning in McLean v.
Pettigrew102 may be suspect but the result, as Lewis v. Leigh03 shows,
may be the same.
Nor did the Court of Appeal find the matter much easier. See [1985] 6 W.W.R. 641 at 645:
The issues argued before us cannot be dealt with separately or neatly. Every attempt at
order fails. The legislative entanglement cannot be circumvented. The regulations and
the Acts are appalling. We have had the benefit of carefully prepared factums and
competent, experienced counsel. They have struggled to find a path through the tangle.
During argument they were obliged to withdraw from paths that were blocked. One
attempted to create a new path by asking us to add a "not" when interpreting British
Columbia legislation.
96. [1985] 2 W.W.R. 652 at 125 (B.C.S.C.).
97. [1983] 6 W.W.R. 340 at 359 (B.C.S.C.).
98. Supra, note32.
99. Supra, note71.
100. Supra, note 29.
101. Supra, note 32.
102. Supra note42.
103. Supra note 52.
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The following questions as a minimum need to be resolved, preferably
by the legislature and insurance industry:
1. Are they content for litigation to be heard in a jurisdiction other
than either the lex loci delicti or the province in which the
plaintiff was resident at the time of the accident?
2. Are the very wide exjuris rules, which allow a certain amount
of forum shopping by the plaintiff, constitutional or do they
deal with property and civil rights outside the province under
the Royal Bank of Canada v. The King case'0?
3. Are the agreements between the Rigie and the common law
provinces intended to deal with all accidents in Quebec even
though all the litigants reside elsewhere? It may be that giving
all persons injured in Quebec some recovery is better than
leaving non-Quebec residents with limited Section B benefits to
supplement a traditional fault-based tort action.10 5
In addition it seems that all too often the various undertakings, riders,
etc., have been put together with inadequate consideration of the conflicts
implications. In the case of some of the voluntary riders such S.E.E 42,
one is left with the thought that merchandising policies designed to fill a
gap in the market have received more thought and effort than the
conflicts ramifications and their actuarial consequences.
(C) Alastair Bissett-Johnson, 1987.
104. [1913] A.C. 283 (P.C.). In solving this, one should consider whether the recent House of
Lords cases on forum non conveniens are relevant within a confederation. See J. Swan The
Canadian Constitution, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws (1985), 63 Can. Bar Rev. 271.
105. See R. Hasson and H. Glasbeek "Fault - The Great Hoax" in Klar (ed.), Studies in
Canadian TortLaw, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977).
